Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7494/dmms.2017.11.1-2.31Keywords:
corporate shareholding analysis, cooperative game theory, direct and indirect control, financial and economic modeling, power indicesAbstract
This paper is devoted to the concept of indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors has been proposed. We focus in particular on a game-theoretical approach; specifically the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program „Control Sharing Simulation”.
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