Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations

Izabella Stach

Abstract


This paper is devoted to indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors were proposed. We focuses in particular on a game-theoretical approach, namely on the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program “Control Sharing Simulation.”


Keywords


corporate shareholding analysis; cooperative game theory; direct and indirect control; financial and economic modeling; power indices

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7494/dmms.2017.11.1-2.31

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