On Public Values and Power Indices
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7494/dmms.2015.9.1.9Keywords:
cooperative game theory, simple game, values, public values, power indices, public power indicesAbstract
In this paper we analyze, from a different point of view, some values and power indices well defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular we consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help index (Bertini, Gambarelli and Stach, 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) called also Zipke index (Nevison, Zicht and Schoepke, 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values.
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Accepted 2015-07-15
Published 2016-02-17
